+ If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It, Noûs, forthcoming (PDF)
I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, epistemic 'ought' implies a certain psychological 'can.'
+ Amodal Completion and Knowledge, (with Bence Nanay), Analysis, forthcoming (PDF)
Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue that at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. We then show that at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are neither sensitive nor safe. These forms of knowledge are novel counter-examples to both the view that knowledge is necessarily sensitive and the view that knowledge is necessarily safe.
+ Visually Perceiving The Intentions of Others, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2018 (PDF)
I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely-studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the stimulus. I further argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to show that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally.
+ Recent Issues in High-Level Perception, Philosophy Compass, 2016 (PDF)
Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, such as natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe some emerging defenses of high-level perception, including one which appeals to adaptation effects, and I sketch a challenge for this approach.
+ Skepticism & Solipsism
I argue that the most plausible route to skepticism proceeds via metaphysical solipsism.
+ Against the Doxastic Theory of Perception
I develop a new challenge for doxastic theories of perception and show how the challenge arises for all versions of the theory, including dual-factor versions and versions which rely on a phenomenalist semantics of perception.
+ Implicit Bias & Emotion
There is a well-established relationship between implicit bias and emotion. I draw on recent empirical work to argue that this relation is constitutive. Specifically, at least some implicit biases are at least partly comprised of dispositions to feel certain emotions in response to members of relevant social groups.