Papers

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+ If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It, Noûs (PDF)

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, epistemic 'ought' implies a certain psychological 'can.'

+ Visually Perceiving The Intentions of Others, The Philosophical Quarterly (PDF)

I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely-studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the stimulus. I further argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to show that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally.

+ Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps and The Grounds of Authenticity (with Chris Register), special issue of Synthese (PDF)

We draw on empirical evidence to argue that so-called hot-cold empathy gaps derive from a kind of simulation, and we argue that this process of simulation does not typically confer knowledge, even when the relevant verdicts happen to be accurate. We suggest that this outcome poses a problem for L.A. Paul's view that authentic action sometimes requires knowledge from simulation. We then sketch an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and authenticity, one which avoids this problem.

+ Epistemological Solipsism as a Route to External World Skepticism, Philosophical Perspectives (PDF)

I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that, for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions extend to knowledge of other minds. Finally, and also tentatively: epistemological solipsism warrants more philosophical attention than it currently enjoys.

+ Subjectivity in Film: Mine, Yours, and No One's (with Sara Aronowitz), Ergo (PDF)

We argue that the subject of film experience is sometimes a mere impersonal viewpoint, sometimes a first-personal but unindexed subject, and sometimes a particular, indexed subject such as the viewer herself or a character in the film. We first argue for subject pluralism: there is no single answer to the question of what kind of subjectivity, if any, is mandated across film sequences. Then, we defend unindexed subjectivity: at least sometimes, films mandate an experience that is first-personal but not tied to any particular person, not even to the viewer. Taken together, these two theses allow us to see film experience as more varied than previously appreciated and to bridge in a novel way the cognition of film with the exercise of other imaginative capacities, such as mindreading and episodic recollecting.

+ The Simulation Hypothesis, Social Knowledge, and a Meaningful Life, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind (PDF) (Slides)

In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Inspired by these points from Chalmers, I explore more generally the value of non-social knowledge versus social knowledge for a meaningful life, where non-social knowledge is empirical knowledge that is not dependent on other minds and social knowledge is empirical knowledge that is dependent on other minds. I argue that in general, the value of social knowledge for a meaningful life dramatically swamps the value of non-social knowledge. Along the way, I defend a non-additive model of how value contributes to a meaningful life.

+ Thought Experiments as Tools of Theory Clarification, Routledge Studies in Epistemology (PDF)

It is widely presumed that intuitions about thought experiments can help overturn philosophical theories. It is also widely presumed, albeit implicitly, that if thought experiments play any epistemic role in overturning philosophical theories, it is via intuition. In this paper, I argue for a different, neglected epistemic role of philosophical thought experiments, that of improving some reasoner’s appreciation both of what a theory’s predictions consist in and of how those predictions tie to elements of the theory. I call this role theory clarification. I show that theory clarification does not proceed via intuition, and I argue that it is only in conjunction with theory clarification that intuitions about thought experiments can help overturn philosophical theories. I close by sketching how a more radical view might be true, on which thought experiments help justify the rejection of philosophical theories exclusively by clarifying theories, not by generating intuitions.

+ On Being a Lonely Brain-in-a-Vat: Structuralism, Solipsism, and the Threat from External World Skepticism, Analytic Philosophy (PDF)

David Chalmers has recently developed a novel strategy of refuting external world skepticism, one he dubs the structuralist solution. In this paper, I make three primary claims: First, structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, even if it is combined with a functionalist approach to the metaphysics of minds. Second, because structuralism does not vindicate knowledge of other minds, the structuralist solution vindicates far less worldly knowledge than we would hope for from a solution to skepticism. For, solipsism threatens surprisingly vast swathes of worldly knowledge across multiple domains, including at least some knowledge about: political affairs, religious practices, artistic movements, historical events, and cultural trends. Third, the significance of these results exceeds their implications for the structuralist solution; these results suggest that no solution to external world skepticism which does not also solve the problem of other minds will ultimately yield the kind of solution we might have hoped for.

+ Viewpoint Convergence as a Philosophical Defect, Attitude in Philosophy (PDF)

Philosophers famously diverge in the answers they give to philosophical questions. It is widely presumed that a lack of convergence on these questions suggests that philosophy is not progressing at all, is not progressing fast enough, or is not progressing as fast as other disciplines, such as the natural sciences. Call the view that ideal philosophical progress is marked by at least some degree of convergence on the core philosophical questions the pro-convergence thesis. I will argue that there is reason to reject the pro-convergence thesis in favor of the anti-convergence thesis, the view that significant viewpoint convergence is at odds with the aims of a philosophically ideal community. The argument centers on a thought experiment about two different philosophical communities.

+ Amodal Completion and Knowledge, (with Bence Nanay), Analysis (PDF)

Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue that at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. We then show that at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are neither sensitive nor safe. These forms of knowledge are novel counter-examples to both the view that knowledge is necessarily sensitive and the view that knowledge is necessarily safe.

+ Recent Issues in High-Level Perception, Philosophy Compass (PDF)

Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, such as natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe some emerging defenses of high-level perception, including one which appeals to adaptation effects, and I sketch a challenge for this approach.

+ Against the Very Idea of a Perceptual Belief, (with Bence Nanay), Analytic Philosophy (PDF)

The aim of this paper is to argue that there is no unproblematic way of delineating perceptual beliefs from non-perceptual beliefs. We consider three ways of cashing out the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual beliefs (semantic, justificatory, and etiological) and argue that none of them works. Finally, we explore the possibility of understanding perceptual justification without relying on the concept of perceptual beliefs

In Progress

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+ Implicit Bias & Emotion

There is a well-established relationship between implicit bias and emotion. I draw on recent empirical work to argue that this relation is constitutive. Specifically, at least some implicit biases are at least partly comprised of dispositions to feel certain emotions in response to members of relevant social groups. (email for slides)

+ a paper on judgment-based views of perception

(email for draft)

+ a paper on suffering & the simulation hypothesis

(email for handout)

+ a paper on how emotions fade and Why This Matters

(email for handout)